Body of the Motion:
The evidence of the extent or amount of property damage is irrelevant.
Because the fact of the collision and the damage to the vehicles involved are not at issue in this case, photographs of the vehicles, property damage invoices, or other evidence regarding the extent or amount of property damage is not relevant. Georgia Rule of Evidence O.C.G.A. §24-2-1 defines relevant evidence as “evidence that relates to the questions being tried by the jury and bear upon them either directly or indirectly. Evidence that fails to meet that definition is irrelevant and is inadmissible. O.C.G.A. §24-2-1.
The Defendant has admitted causing the collision. Additionally, neither party has made a claim for property damage in this suit. Because neither the fact of the collision nor the amount of damage to the vehicles is at issue in this case, evidence discussing such issues does not make any fact of consequence more or less probable.
The extent or amount of property damage lacks the requisite foundation and testimony.
Because the fact of the collision and the damage to the vehicles are not issues in this case, the only conceivable purpose for evidence of the extent or amount of property damage is to invite the jury to speculate on the issue of causation (or absence thereof). To prove or disprove causation, however, the party must present competent evidence through competent witnesses after a proper foundation has been laid for the witnesses’ testimony.
The defense has not designated any expert witnesses to testify as to causation or lack thereof. Instead, the defense will simply refer to the photographs or repair invoices for the vehicles and argue that the jury use their “common sense” and find that Plaintiff’s injuries could not have been caused in this collision. Georgia courts require testimony, not argument, to prove or disprove causation and damages.
Use of evidence of property damage in this manner requires a proper foundation be laid through an expert witness. Interpreting the force of an impact from vehicle photographs and then assessing the likelihood of injury from such impact are tasks that can only be attempted by experts. Such matters are not within jurors’ realm of common sense.
For example, the issue of determining the force of the impact in a two-vehicle collision has been debated in scientific literature for years.Determining how much energy was transferred from the object vehicle to the target vehicle alone is extremely difficult to accomplish because most of the vehicle crash tests are conducted with a vehicle and fixed object (rather than between two vehicles).
Furthermore, most of the crash tests are performed at speeds exceeding 30 m.p.h., therefore, making it virtually impossible to extrapolate the crush values to lower speed collisions. Lastly, vehicles vary considerably in their ability to absorb certain impacts without showing damage. In fact, the same vehicle may show little damage after one type of impact, but extensive damage from another type of impact.
Even if it were possible to determine how much energy was transferred from one car to another, it is usually impossible to then ascertain exactly how much energy was transferred to the occupant of the target vehicle (as opposed to how much energy was absorbed by the vehicle). Assuming we could compute how much energy from the object vehicle reached the occupant, we would then need to know how it caused the occupant to move. To calculate this, we would need to know things like how the occupant was seated, their head position relative to the head rest and whether their head was turned. These computations can only be made by a biomechanical expert or someone with biomechanical training.
Discovery has closed, and there has not been a designation of an expert on this issue. Many are correctly finding that such evidence is not admissible when it is not accompanied by supporting expert testimony to establish an adequate foundation. See Davis v. Maute, 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2001) (reversible error to admit evidence of property damage and allow counsel to argue serious injuries could not have resulted from “minor” collision).
The Davis court correctly found: As a general rule, a party in a personal injury case may not directly argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car accident correlates to the extent of the damage to the cars, unless the party can produce competent expert testimony on the issue. Absent such testimony, any inference by the jury that minimal damage to the Plaintiff’s car translates into minimal personal injuries to the Plaintiff would necessarily amount to unguided speculation. Davis, 770 A.2d at 42. The Davis holding was reaffirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Eskin v Carden, 842 A. 2d 1222 (Del. 2004). See also, Brenman v. Demello, 383 N.J.Super. 521, 892 A.2d 741 (N.J.Super.A.D.,2006).
Thanks to Glenn Loewenthal, Esq.
